Two perspectives on Europe

Two perspectives on Europe

This text is a response to the paper concerned with the European enterprise. Two alternative perspectives - each representing "the truth but not the whole truth."

Joop de Vries Sociovision, Paris

"Slow down and think"

"Slow down and think"

Europe's institutions failed to move on at the end of the 19^th century, and, as a result, Europe lost its position as the major world power during the first half of the 20^th century. In addition, it lost its moral credentials. Shame about the past and the threat of communism, forced Europeans to do 'something'. The only 'something' they could come up with, was a centrist, directive, non-controversial and non-democratic equivalent of NATO. When this new 'economic community' proved to be successful, success was wrongly attributed to the concept of European integration, instead of to the return of normal long term economic trends.

When the new European entity had to be defined, Europeans wanted it to be different and typically European. In addition, it had to be acceptable to all. Hence the 'caring Europe' concept - to be compared with a 'competitive America' and a 'consensual Japan'. The concept developed in parallel with Europe's booming economy, but in later years, it became clear that it also carried a price tag - such as a reduction of free external trade and expensive food.

European integration was embraced as the lesser evil, in particular by France that worried about a powerful and dominant Mittel-Europe under German leadership. The integration concept was never proposed to the people, nor approved by them - even after the event. It implies a severe loss of autonomy of the nation states, similar, as some would like to see it, to the limited degree of autonomy experienced by States in the US. However, US-style integration will take generations, and, in Europe, the well-established US-style decision-making mechanisms are completely missing.

The modern challenges make matters worse. Adapting to growing complexity requires trust, as, without it, we cannot delegate and adapt. Integration reduces frictional barriers, but it creates rigidity and, often, additional costs. Harmonisation, for the same reason, is less good at making countries adaptable than reliance on a network of capabilities. Europe is most popular with people who see the EU as an injection of new impulses which their political establishments have resisted for generations. Only pluralism can make a multitude of nations cooperate, when each nation will only cede unilateral power if it gains equivalent or greater advantage. In order to hide this dilemma, we spend too little time thinking about what could and should be done. The result may very well be that Europe will be bypassed by technological change and the networked structure of the rest of the world.

The great adventure

The great adventure

Europe's former dominant position in the world could under no circumstances have been maintained indefinitely. Industrialisation and technology were exported all over the world, where, in 'empty' countries with abundant natural resources - such as North America - they were the basis for even more rapid expansion. At the same time, the concepts of slavery and colonialism, lost legitimacy. Because Europe's political elites were mediocre and unable to understand the profound changes taking place, they focused exclusively on their vested interests. By exploiting the dark powers of dangerous tools, such as chauvinism and nationalism, they avoided the need for change. Millions believed they had to die for 'king and country', and social Darwinism developed into theories as to who was superior or inferior. In the process, Europe got rid of despots and monarchs, but it destroyed legitimacy and self-respect. The thirty-year war 1914-1945 produced no winners, although the old elites were finally swept from power.

After the second world war, which was to be the main event in the lives of millions of Europeans, there were strong currents of idealism and integrity ("never again") - even though colonial powers were still fighting their final battles. Political integration was impossible, because of the deep divisions of Europe during the war, but also because of nationalism and parochialism. The only feasible concrete proposition was economic co-operation, - with the added advantage that the international competition in steel and coal production, in weapons and ships, could thus be internationalised. Only four countries (France, Germany, Italy, Benelux) started this venture, guided by statesmen the likes of whom European countries are not seeing today. Peace was a major rationale of 'Europe', and it still is, even though traditional wars between European countries have become impossible. When Messrs Kohl and Mitterand stood hand in hand in Verdun, they expressed the original rationale of European co-operation.

In an historic perspective, it is surprising how much, not how little, has been achieved. The EU enjoys widespread support in most countries - with 54% saying that EU membership "is a good thing" vs. 12% "a bad thing". National differences are considerable, ranging from 79% in Ireland to 37% in the UK (which can be as much a matter of media ownership as of national 'culture'). Subsidiarity applies as there are no feasible alternatives. Countries see a task for the EU where the alternative of fifteen governments and policies is obviously wasteful and ineffective. National governments hold the key to all matters of principle in the EU, although most of them do not initiate any discussion in their home countries (Denmark is the exception).

The reasons why Europeans support the EU and expect the EU to play an increasing role, vary from country to country. Even in areas where nation-states have guarded their positions jealously, 'the people' see the logic of harmonisation and creating critical mass. The more Europe feels pressured and bullied by the US, the stronger pressure for European integration will become. These processes are often not rational, and people may prefer the EU to act whether or not they agree with the way European integration is developing. Europe is built on emotions, likes and dislikes, aspirations, trust and distrust. In an era of growing individual autonomy, this is the rule rather than the exception - at the European as well as on the national and regional level.

EU leaders have limited room for manoeuvre : when, for whatever reasons, people become uneasy with the kind of Europe that is developing, things will start going wrong. A small incident (Mrs Cresson) then means the demise of the Commission. We should keep in mind, however, the 'Europe' has so far chosen the right issues, usually ahead of national governments who lack the openness and benefits of working with people from other nationalities and perspectives. Examples of EU policies adopted ahead of their time, are human rights, consumers, regional development, and anti-cartel legislation.

This does not create a 'European identity'. Not surprisingly, Mr Prodi said recently that he fears apathy more than Euro-scepticism. It is far form certain that, at a time that even the regions are rethinking their roles vis a vis the nation-state, a new European idea will soon emerge. The fact that Europe does become more European, is largely unintended : it follows from better infrastructure, cheaper flights, young people more at ease across Europe, multinationals, the same supermarkets and brands everywhere, easy banking, the right to work in every EU country. There is still a long way to go, but the direction is clear.